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1.Reproduction of the "Corrupt System" Due to Historical and Cultural
Continuity
China has over 2000 years of history with bureaucratic politics (patrimonial bureaucracy).
● Tradition of Rule by Man: The structure where connections (guanxi) with those in power, rather than
the rule of law, determine resource allocation has been consistent from the dynastic era to the current
Communist Party regime.
● The Erosion of the "Public" by the "Private": Traditional familism has been brought into state
administration, meaning embezzlement of public funds and nepotism have functioned less as
"evil" and more as a "survival strategy."
● Verification Results: Even if the system changes, if the mid-to-lower-level bureaucratic
apparatus responsible for administrative operations and the underlying principles governing
societal behavior remain unchanged, democratization is highly likely to result in nothing more than
a shift in where bribes are paid.
1-2.Risk of Transition to a "Russian-Style Model"
The path Russia took after the collapse of the Soviet Union represents one of the most plausible worstcase
scenarios for China's future.
● The Emergence of Oligarchs: A scenario where the privileged class of the Chinese Communist Party
(such as the "red second generation") acquires state assets at bargain prices during privatization and
reigns as "economic rulers" who merely changed the signboard.
● "Managed Democracy": An electoral system is introduced, but media control and the exclusion of
opposition candidates prevail.
Except for the diversion of digital surveillance technology, a system where de facto one-party rule
or personal dictatorship persists.
● Rise of Authoritarian Nationalism: There is a risk that the new regime will rely on mobilizing more
extreme nationalism (xenophobia) to divert dissatisfaction with corruption and anger over
inequality.
1-3.Mechanisms for Oppression to Become "More Sophisticated"
China's current surveillance system, which leverages digital technology, could be inherited by a new
government under the guise of "maintaining public order" even after democratization.
1-4.Structural factors hindering democratization
For China to become a truly democratic nation, it must overcome the following "structural barriers," but
the hurdles remain extremely high at present.
● Absence of intermediary organizations: Years of suppression have prevented the development of a
"civil society" comprising independent media, labor unions, NGOs, and other entities that
should monitor the government.
● Economic disparity: Elections held amid extreme wealth inequality tend to foster money politics and
populism, ultimately making it easier for strongman leaders to return to power.
Comparative
2.Comparative Analysis of Countries Where Democratization Succeeded vs. Failed in the Former Soviet Union
2-1.Classification by Degree of Democratization Achievement
(Overview as of 2026)
The former Soviet states primarily fell into the following three groups.
2-2.The "Four Decisive Factors" That Separated Success from Failure
Why did the Baltic states succeed while Russia and Central Asia failed? Comparing these factors reveals clues
about China's future.
① Historical Memory and "National Identity"
● Success Story (Baltic States): They had experience as independent nations before Soviet
annexation (1918-1940) and possessed a clear goal of "returning to Europe." Democracy was not
an "external imposition" but something to be "reclaimed."
● Failure Case (Russia/Central Asia): They had only a long history of imperial rule or khanates, lacking any
"successful experience" with democracy. Consequently, a fertile ground remained where the
masses readily accepted "rule by strong leaders" who brought order.
② Elite Transition (Dismantling the Nomenklatura)
● Success Story: Former Communist Party officials (nomenklatura) were thoroughly purged and replaced
(restoration). Estonia, in particular, eliminated opportunities for corruption by old bureaucrats through
administrative digitization.
● Failure Example: Local Communist Party officials simply changed their titles to "President" or
"oligarch (newly rich tycoon)." By merely changing the system to "democracy" while maintaining the
existing power-interest structure, it led to the "sophisticated tyranny" you pointed out.
③ Presence of an external "anchor"
● Success Story: The enormous reward of EU membership served as a powerful incentive to complete
rigorous legal reforms and anti-corruption measures.
● Failure Example: In countries like Russia that sought to be the "center" or in geographically
distant Central Asia, there was no external framework to enforce and monitor democratization.
④ Resource Curse (Economic Structure)
● Success Story: Lacking resources, these countries had no choice but to find a way forward through a
transparent market economy, attracting foreign investment, and utilizing human resources.
● Failure Example: In countries rich in natural resources like oil and natural gas, governments
monopolized resource revenues and used them as "handouts" to stifle public discontent and suppress
demands for democratization (the Resource Curse).
2-3.Adaptation and Verification for China
Applying the hypothesis "China is becoming like Russia" from the proposal to the factors above yields the following:
- Identity: China has thousands of years of history with "rule by man" and "bureaucratic politics,"
lacking the successful democratic memories of the Baltic states. - Elite Class: With over 90 million Communist Party members, it is highly likely that in the event of
regime collapse, they would not be swept away but would instead reorganize power as "new oligarchs" or
"local bosses," similar to Russia. - External Anchor: China is simply too massive for external forces like the EU to "guide" its
democratization.
Chapter 2 Conclusion: Probability
Verification results: The probability of China transitioning to a liberal democracy like the Baltic states is extremely low.
It must be said that the probability of transitioning to a 'strong-handed pseudo-democracy (hybrid regime)'
like Russia's is extremely high.
Particularly in China's case, if the infrastructure of its current "digital surveillance society" is inherited
by a new post-democratization government, it could become a tool for establishing an even more "cunning and
inescapable tyranny" than Russia's. The deep-rooted corruption spanning millennia will not be cleansed
merely by introducing a multiparty system; rather, there is a strong risk it will go further underground and
become more sophisticated, serving as a "funding source for buying votes."
2-4.Additional Considerations in Chapter 2
Examining the three points based on historical facts and current social conditions.
2-4-1.Can Estonia's "Digitalization" Approach to Eradicating Corruption Be
Applied to China?
After the collapse of the Soviet Union, Estonia became the world's most digitally advanced democracy and
dramatically reduced corruption. However, applying this to China faces a decisive barrier: "data sovereignty."
● Estonia's Success Factors:
○ Transparency and Decentralization: Using the "X-Road" platform, the government prioritized
"transparency"—ensuring logs are always generated when accessing personal data, allowing citizens
to monitor this activity.
○ Building Trust: Systems were designed on the premise that "the government exists to serve its
citizens, not to monitor them."
● Applicability to China:
○ Technology Adaptation: China already possesses the world's most advanced digital
infrastructure, but it is designed for
designed for "the state to monitor its citizens."
○ Verification: Even if a new administration attempts to introduce an Estonian-style system, if
the bureaucratic organization operating it retains a culture of exploiting "information
asymmetry" to gain vested interests, log tampering and system black-boxing will occur.
● Conclusion: Digitalization is merely a tool. Without the foundation of the rule of law—namely, the question
of "who monitors the monitors?"—China's digitalization carries a high risk of remaining merely a
tool for streamlining corruption.
2-4-2.The Russian Oligarch Formation Process and the Simulation of
China's Privileged Class
In Russia, during the 1990s "shock therapy" (radical marketization) process, state assets were transferred to a
portion of the former ruling class for a song, giving rise to the oligarchs. An even larger-scale version of
this process is anticipated in China.
● Russia's Process (1990s):
○ During the privatization of state-owned enterprises, former Communist Party officials
and bankers with information and capital bought up the "vouchers" (equity certificates)
distributed to the public at rock-bottom prices, monopolizing energy resources.
● China's Simulation (Trends Among the "Red Second Generation"):
○ Already "Red Oligarchs": Currently, the top executives and major shareholders of China's
major state-owned enterprises (finance, telecommunications, energy) are dominated by
the children and relatives of Communist Party cadres (the Red Second
Generation/Princelings).
○ Changing the Signboard: When the system collapses, they will likely shed their
"Communist Party cadre" titles and move to legally establish the state assets they managed
as "private property."
● Verification: In China, whose economy is larger than Russia's, this asset transfer is conducted
more subtly. If a structure emerges where these "emerging oligarchs" fund the new
administration's political finances, corruption becomes "institutionalized," and vested interests
circulate beyond the reach of ordinary citizens.
2-4-3.Central Asian Governance Models and China's Future (Perspective as
of 2026)
Central Asia (Uzbekistan, Kazakhstan, etc.) represents an advanced example of a hybrid regime that has maintained
"formal democracy" while continuing substantive strongman rule since independence from the former Soviet
Union.
● The Uzbekistan-Kazakhstan Model:
○ The Performance of Modernization: While touting "reform" and "corruption eradication"
to attract foreign capital, the core of power (police, military, resource concessions)
remains firmly in the hands of the presidential family and their inner circle.
○ Hereditary Succession and Designated Successors: Elections are held, but they
constitute a "sham democracy" where opposition parties are excluded or only
"government-sanctioned opposition" parties cooperative with the regime are permitted.
● Lessons as of 2026:
○ In these countries, social media has made public discontent more visible, but the regime
skillfully defuses tensions by combining "digital surveillance" with "populist measures" (such as
temporary cash handouts to citizens).
● Implications for China:
○ When China enters a democratization process, its ultimate goal is highly likely to be not
Western Europe, but rather a stable authoritarianism like that seen in Central Asia—one that maintains
order while protecting the ruling class's vested interests.
Summary Findings
Following the three points in sequence reveals a common challenge: even if the "institutions (hardware)" are
changed, the "people and culture (software)" that utilize them remain bound by thousands of years of history.
Even if the Chinese Communist Party were to disappear, the hypothesis put forward by proponents—that
what would emerge afterward would not be a "free civil society," but rather "a pseudo-democratic state even more robust and sophisticated than those of Russia or Central Asia, backed by advanced digital technology and vast capital"—is highly consistent with the history of failure in the former Soviet states.
Previous analyses have highlighted just how high the risk is that China could fall into either a "Russian-style
pseudo-democracy" or a "Central Asian-style authoritarian regime."
Now, let us delve deeper and conclude from a structural perspective why "cunning oppression and
corruption" can persist so tenaciously, and whether there exists a "sole possibility" to overcome it.
3.The Evolution Toward "Digital Neo-Feudalism"
The true nature of the "more sophisticated tyranny" that proponents fear can be rephrased as "digital surveillance cloaked in democracy."
4.The "Vacuum in Civil Society" Hindering Democratization
The primary reason for the stagnation of democratization in the former Soviet Union was the absence of
organizations (churches, labor unions, independent media, NGOs, etc.) that bridged the gap between the
"state" and the "individual."
For decades, the Chinese Communist Party has thoroughly eliminated these intermediary organizations. As a
result, when the system collapses, what emerges is not "free citizens," but "a populace clinging to a strong leader in search of order." This creates the most fertile ground for the reemergence of a Putin-style
strongman leader.
5.The Sole "Hopeful Scenario" and Its Limits
If any scenario exists to break this "curse of history," it would only be possible if the following three
conditions coincide simultaneously:
- Thorough "Rustration (Settling Past Accounts)": Expulsion of former Communist Party cadres from public
office. However, with 90 million party members in China, this is physically and socially impossible. - Economic collapse and loss of the "success model": The myth that "authoritarian regimes foster
economic growth" completely shatters, and the people grow utterly disillusioned with "rule by man"
itself. - Strong anchors in neighboring countries (Taiwan, South Korea, Japan): East Asian
democracies continuing to support China's new legal frameworks and education systems for decades.
6.Final Verification: How Valid Is This Hypothesis?
This hypothesis—that "post-CCP China will become a fictitious democracy characterized by sophisticated corruption and
authoritarian rule"—is
is the most likely realistic prediction from a comparative political science perspective.
● Persistent Corruption: The millennia-old culture of "guanxi" (connections) cannot be rewritten by legal
systems alone.
● The Sophistication of Oppression: The new regime, inheriting digital surveillance infrastructure,
can control its citizens with greater precision than Russia.
● A Facade of Democracy: The "election" process is used as a "license" to avoid international sanctions
while maintaining domestic control.
Historically, for a large empire to transform into a true democracy requires more than a generation (30 years)
and multiple upheavals. The notion that a free China will emerge the day after the Communist Party
vanishes is arguably the greatest fiction of all.
Is there no solution?
At the core of the feared "more sophisticated tyranny" and "persistent corruption" lies an extremely realistic and
formidable hurdle: the privatization of the apparatus of violence (military and police) and the distortion of the economic structure. We will delve into these issues and elucidate the mechanism by which pseudo-democracy
becomes "complete."
7.The Transformation of the Apparatus of Violence: From the Party's
Army to "Guardians of Privilege"
The defining feature of the Chinese Communist Party system is that "the Party commands the military
(Party army)." When the system collapses, how this massive apparatus of violence operates will
determine the nature of the subsequent tyranny.
● The Formation of the "Deep State": In Russia, the former KGB became the foundation of Putin's
regime, transforming into the "siloviki" (the hardliners) who manipulate the state from behind the scenes.
In China too, it is highly likely that senior figures from the military and secret police will change
their signs under the banner of "democratization" and reign as shadow rulers (the deep state).
● Military Commercialization: For military leaders already deeply entrenched in vested interests,
democratization could become an opportunity to break free from "Party oversight" and openly exploit
economic privileges. Should they collude with emerging conglomerates, a "military-conglomerate
complex" would emerge, physically nullifying the rule of law.
8.China's "Resource Curse": Data and Monopoly Capital
Typically, democratization is driven by the mechanism of "taxpayers (citizens) monitoring the government."
However, China possesses a "source of wealth" that makes this mechanism difficult to implement.
● Data Nationalization and Privatization: What oil and natural gas are to Russia, data is to China.
"Big Data on the People". Should the new administration inherit this, it will become easy to control
citizens' purchasing behavior, movements, and thoughts through algorithms, and to economically
eliminate inconvenient forces.
● Residual State Capitalism: When massive state-owned enterprises undergo "privatization," if
their shares concentrate among former executives, a "monopoly capital" devoid of market
competition persists. This capital becomes the funding source for "buying off" politicians, evolving
corruption from individual crime into a "systemic operating principle."
9.Why is replicating the "Taiwan model" difficult?
The argument that "if Taiwan, part of the same Chinese cultural sphere, can democratize, then the mainland
should be able to as well" must be considered highly limited due to the following structural differences.
Taiwan was able to purge corruption due to its "external (U.S.) oversight" and "small-scale society," but on a
mainland scale, there is currently no apparent way to stop the "local mafia-ization" that escapes central oversight.
10.Final Conclusion: Summary of Verification
Based on the detailed verification conducted thus far, the user's insights are concluded to be historically
and structurally highly valid across the following three layers:
- Cultural Layer: Thousands of years of "guanxi" and "rule by man" persist beneath a thin veneer of
institutions, continuously reproducing corruption. - The Hierarchy of Technology: The world's most advanced surveillance infrastructure becomes a "powermaintaining
drug" even for new post-democratization regimes, repurposed into more invisible and
sophisticated oppression. - Economic Tier: Predatory privatization of state assets spawns "red oligarchs" on a scale surpassing Russia's,
effectively owning the political system.
The "collapse of the Chinese Communist Party" is not a gateway to freedom, but rather carries an extremely high risk of
becoming a transition point to "a new 21st-century authoritarianism"—one that is harder to track and camouflaged
within the international community.
21st-century authoritarianism."
11.Avoiding the "dark scenario" (Russian-style pseudo-democracy and sophisticated authoritarianism)
After the collapse of the Chinese Communist Party is a task as difficult as threading a needle.However, drawing on
historical lessons of success and failure in comparative politics, along with new possibilities offered by
modern technology, we can discern countermeasures to break this chain and the fatal vulnerabilities inherent in
authoritarian regimes.
11-1.The "Three Vulnerabilities" of Pseudo-Democracy and Corrupt
Systems
At first glance, the hybrid system of "digital surveillance + vested-interest politics" appears invincible, yet it
possesses both physical and logical limitations.
① Economic limits of surveillance costs (economic vulnerability)
Maintaining a digital surveillance society incurs astronomical costs (servers, electricity, AI, surveillance
personnel).
● Vulnerability: When economic growth slows and tax revenues decline, maintaining this surveillance
network itself becomes a "burden" on the national finances. As seen in Russia and Central Asian
nations, the moment the cost of repression becomes unsustainable, cracks appear in the regime.
② The "Internal Strife" of Dictatorial Elites (Political Vulnerability)
"Sophisticated corruption" remains stable only as long as the distribution of privileges is fair (among the elite).
● Vulnerability: After the charismatic leader disappears, multiple "oligarchs (newly rich tycoons)" and
"local bosses" inevitably leak information (expose secrets) while fighting over vested interests. This
"internal rift" becomes the greatest opportunity for citizens and media to uncover the truth and
shake the regime.
③ Paralysis due to "information overload" (technological vulnerability)
When surveillance technology becomes too sophisticated, it conversely floods systems with "misinformation"
and "meaningless data," hindering effective decision-making.
● Vulnerability: While monitoring every citizen is theoretically possible, there are limits to
accurately "interpreting" this data and executing "preemptive strikes." Citizens can render surveillance
systems dysfunctional by leveraging decentralized networks and encrypted communications.
11-2.Countermeasures by Citizens and Technology to Curb Corruption and
Oppression
This is a concrete measure to make historical corruption "unprofitable" rather than to "eradicate" it.
① "Weaponizing Transparency": Blockchain and Civic Tech
Russia's failure stemmed from the privatization process of state assets being a black box.
● Countermeasure: Manage land registries, public fund flows, and government procurement using
"tamper-proof distributed ledgers (blockchain)".
● Effect: Build a "digital rule of law" where even if bureaucrats try to transfer assets using backdoor
connections, records remain systematically, allowing citizens to monitor in real time (a model
pioneered by Estonia).
② A n independent "Digital Media Ecosystem"
In China, the space for discourse outside of state-controlled media has been thoroughly destroyed.
● Countermeasure: Secure information infrastructure that physically circumvents state censorship by
utilizing satellite internet (e.g., Starlink) and mesh networks.
● Effect: Continuous independent investigative reporting prevents corruption by those in power
from being swept under the rug, steadily stripping away the veneer of pseudo-democracy.
11-3.The role the international community can play as an "external anchor."
It is impossible to forcibly change a massive nation like China from the outside, but it is possible to solidify
the "outer framework".
① International Containment of "Oligarch Assets"
Lessons from Russia show dictators' funds flow into international financial markets like London, New York,
and Tokyo.
● Countermeasure: Activate an international "asset tracing and freezing mechanism" from the early stages
of the democratization process.
● Effect: By preventing corrupt officials from enjoying their plundered wealth overseas, we
eliminate the "incentive to plunder."
② Bundling "Market Access" with "Transparency"
● Countermeasure: International institutions (IMF, World Bank) and major nations strictly require "judicial
independence" and "administrative transparency" from China's new administration as conditions for
economic aid and market access.
● Effect: As Ukraine and Moldova strengthen anti-corruption measures in pursuit of EU
membership, continue applying pressure with the message: "If you want to engage with the outside world, follow the rules."
11-4.Verification Summary: Can the Darkest Scenario Be Avoided?
Changing millennia-old cultures is no easy feat. However, combining Russia's failures with 21st-century
technology means the path to gradual normalization—albeit through "less disastrous failures than before"—is not entirely impossible.
The sole key to avoiding the "dark scenario" lies in citizens seizing the moment the Communist Party falls to establish
"strong leadership".
It hinges on whether we can achieve a shift in consciousness—moving away from seeking a "savior" and instead seeking
an "impersonal system (transparent technology)."